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David A. Wise
The Japan Center for Economic Research and the National Bureau of
Economic Research have been engaged in joint projects on the economics
of aging and related areas for several years. Two prior conference volumes
reporting the results of these studies have been published: Aging in the
United States and Japan in 1994, and The Economic Eﬀects of Aging in
the United States and Japan in 1997. This volume contains papers pre-
sented in Kyoto, Japan, in May 1997. The papers are focused on four top-
ics: (a) saving, wealth, and asset allocation over the life cycle, (b) health
care and health care reform, (c) incentives for early retirement, as well as
labor market incentives over the working life, and (d) population projec-
tions. In all but the fourth category, papers from both Japan and the
United States are included. While the papers in the volume from the two
countries are not strictly comparable, when considering the larger body of
evidence in Japan and the United states, the evidence from one country
canb ec ontrasted with similar evidence from the other. The following sum-
mary draws heavily on the wording of the authors themselves.
Saving, Wealth, and Asset Allocation
In the United States
As the retired population grows relative to the working population, the
prospects for public ﬁnancing of support in retirement have generated in-
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1creasing public and private concern. Yet a large fraction of Americans
depend almost entirely on Social Security for support in retirement, and
most Americans now reaching retirement age have accumulated very little
in personal saving. Others have accumulated substantial saving. Why do
someh ouseholds have substantial wealth at retirement while others have
very little? Indeed, why do some households with given lifetime earnings
have substantial wealth at retirement, while other households with the
same lifetime earnings accumulate very little wealth? In their paper on
“Choice, Chance, and Wealth Dispersion at Retirement,” Steven F. Venti
and David A. Wise conclude that most of the dispersion in wealth, given
similar lifetime earnings, must be attributed to the choice of whether to
save at younger ages.
People accumulate diﬀerent amounts of wealth in part because they
have diﬀerent earnings. We essentially set that dispersion aside by consid-
ering persons with similar lifetime earnings. Thus the discussion here is
about the dispersion of asset accumulation among persons with the same
lifetime earnings. Given lifetime earnings, Venti and Wise consider the im-
portance of “chance” events versus the choice to save in determining asset
accumulation.
Whether accumulated wealth is attributable to the choice to save rather
than to chance can have signiﬁcant implications for government policy.
Many policies impose ex post taxes on accumulated assets. For example,
elderly Americans who have saved when young and thus have higher capi-
tal incomes when older pay higher taxes on Social Security beneﬁts. Sho-
vena nd Wise (1997, 1998) show that those who save too much in pension
plans in particular face very large “success” tax penalties when pension
beneﬁts are withdrawn. In addition, pension assets left as a bequest can be
virtually conﬁscated through the tax system. The spend-down Medicaid
provision is another example. The belief—perhaps unstated—that chance
events determine the dispersion in wealth may weigh in favor of such taxes
in the legislative voting that imposes them.
If, on the other hand, the dispersion of wealth among the elderly reﬂects
conscious lifetime spending versus saving decisions—rather than diﬀer-
encesi nlifetime resources—these higher taxes may be harder to justify
and appear to penalize savers who spend less when they are young. From
an economic perspective, if wealth accumulation is random, taxing saving
has no incentive eﬀects. On the other hand, if wealth accumulation results
from conscious decisions to save versus spend, penalizing savers may have
substantial incentive eﬀects, discouraging individuals from saving for their
ownr etirement and limiting aggregate economic growth. It is important
to understand that this paper is about the dispersion in the accumulation
of assets of persons with similar lifetime incomes. The issue raised here is
nota bout progressive taxation, but rather about diﬀerences in tax imposed
on persons who spend tomorrow versus today, given the same after-tax
lifetime earnings.
2D a vid A. WiseIn 1953 Milton Friedman wrote a paper he called “Choice, Chance, and
the Personal Distribution of Income.” In this paper he says,
Diﬀerencesa mong individuals or families in the amount of income re-
ceiveda re generally regarded as reﬂecting either circumstances largely
outside the control of the individuals concerned, such as unavoidable
chance occurrences and diﬀerences in natural endowment and inherited
wealth....T h ew a yt h a ti n d i vidual choice can aﬀect the distribution of
income has been less frequently noticed.T he alternatives open to an
individual diﬀer,a mong other respects, in the probability distribution
of income they promise. Hence his choice among them depends in part
on his taste for risk....T h ef o r egoing analysis is exceedingly tenta-
tive....Y e tIthink it goes far enough to demonstrate that one cannot
rule out the possibility that a large part of the existing inequality of
wealth can be regarded as produced by men to satisfy their tastes and
preferences.
Now, over forty years later, “people earn just enough to get by” is a
phrase often used to explain the low personal saving rate in the United
States. The implicit presumption is that households simply do not earn
enough to pay for current needs and to save. Yet in other developed coun-
tries the saving rate at all income levels is much higher than in the United
States. Even in Canada—in many respects similar to the United States—
the personal saving rate is almost twice as high as that in the United States.
Such international comparisons alone suggest that saving depends on
much more than lifetime earnings.
Ventia nd Wise show in this paper that at all levels of lifetime earnings
there is an enormous dispersion in the accumulated wealth of families ap-
proaching retirement. In the United States it is not only households with
low incomes that save little. A signiﬁcant proportion of high-income
households also saves very little. And, not all low-income households are
nonsavers. Indeed, a substantial proportion of low-income households
saves a great deal. The authors then consider the extent to which diﬀer-
encesi nh ousehold lifetime ﬁnancial resources explain the wide dispersion
in wealth, given lifetime earnings. They ﬁnd that very little of this disper-
sion canb ee x plained by chance diﬀerences in individual circumstances—
“largely outside the control of the individuals”—that might limit the re-
sources from which saving might plausibly be made. We conclude that the
bulk of the dispersion must be attributed to diﬀerences in the amounts
that households choose to save. Choices vary enormously across house-
holds. Some choose to save more and spend less over their working lives,
whereas others choose to save little and spend more while working. Wide
dispersion in saving is evident at all levels of lifetime earnings, from the
lowest to the highest. The diﬀerences in saving choices among households
with similar lifetime earnings lead to vastly diﬀerent levels of asset accu-
mulation by the time retirement age approaches.
Perhaps more closely related to the choice of risk that Friedman empha-
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wealth might be accounted for by diﬀerent investment choices of savers—
somem orer isky, some less risky—again given lifetime earnings. The au-
thors ﬁnd that investment choice matters but is not a major determinant
of the dispersion in asset accumulation. It matters about as much as
chance events that limit the available resources of households with the
same lifetime earnings. Thus, although investment choices make a diﬀer-
ence, the overwhelming determinant of the accumulation of wealth at re-
tirement is simply the choice to save.
As a benchmark Venti and Wise also considered the assets that the
Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) respondents would have accumu-
lated had they saved given amounts over their working lives and earned
given returns on their saving. Saving 10 percent of earnings and earning
the average annual S&P 500 return (which has been 12.2 percent since
1926) would have led to accumulated assets much greater than the typical
ﬁnancial assets of HRS households at the time of the survey.
Perhaps based on the presumption—contrary to Friedman’s conjec-
ture—that diﬀerences in wealth can be attributed more to diﬀerences
across households in adverse circumstances that limit saving than to ex-
plicit individual choices, government policy often penalizes persons who
have saved over their lifetimes. For example, persons with the same life-
time earnings will face very diﬀerent tax rates on Social Security beneﬁts:
Thosew ho saved will pay higher taxes, while those who did not will pay
lower taxes. Shoven and Wise (1997, 1998) show that persons who save
toom uch through personal or employer-provided pensions face enormous
tax penalties when they use these accumulated assets for retirement sup-
port. The evidence that diﬀerences in retirement wealth are due largely to
saving choice while younger brings into question this tendency in tax pol-
icy. Although the distribution of the tax burden will inevitably be based
on many factors, most observers believe that the extent to which older
persons with more assets are taxed should depend in part on how they
acquired the assets. Chance accumulation may weigh on the side of heavier
taxes on those who have accumulated. On the other hand, accumulation
by choosing to consume less when young, while others choose to consume
more when young, weights against heavier taxes on those who accumulate
assets for retirement. As emphasized at the outset, this paper is about the
dispersion in the accumulation of assets of persons with similar lifetime
earnings. The issue raised here is not about progressive income taxation,
butr a ther—given the same after-tax earnings—about diﬀerences in the
tax imposed on persons who save today in order to spend more tomorrow,
versus those who spend everything today. The authors’ analysis suggests
that a very large proportion of the variation in the wealth of older house-
holds can be attributed to household saving choices while younger rather
than to chance events that may have limited the resources available for
4D a vid A. Wisesaving. To the extent that most asset accumulation is due to choice rather
than chance, the authors’ results also suggest that ex ante taxing of saving
may have more serious consequences for saving than may previously have
been thought.
Finally, Venti and Wise explored the relationship between household
saving and information about household saving that was obtained through
two experimental saving modules administered in the third wave of the
HRS. In general, the experimental module responses were consistent with
household realized asset accumulation. About three-fourths of respon-
dents said they had saved too little over the past twenty or thirty years,
and the authors found a strong relationship between a household percen-
tile levelo fassets, given lifetime earnings, and whether respondents
thought they had saved enough. The accumulation of retirement assets is
very strongly related to the age at which persons began to save for retire-
ment. In addition, persons who accumulated more retirement assets
tended to have a saving target or plan, and the plan typically included
saving a portion of each paycheck. Those who accumulated little were
more likely to say that they just couldn’t get caught up on their bills or
that they had a hard time sticking to a saving plan. Low saving rates seem
to be only weakly related to an expectation that Social Security or em-
ployer pension plans would take care of retirement income, even among
households with low lifetime earnings. The potential cost of health care is
animportantconcernofalargefractionofhouseholds,andthisconcernap-
pearst ob eunrelated to asset accumulation. On the other hand, there ap-
pearst ob er elatively little concern about job loss, support of children or
parents, or ﬁnancial market collapse. The results from the HRS experimen-
tal saving modules suggests that this type of information collection might
fruitfully be pursued in more depth.
While Venti and Wise consider the reasons for wealth dispersion at re-
tirement, James M. Poterba and Andrew A. Samwick examine changes in
the ways people save over their lifetimes. This issue has become increas-
ingly important as a larger fraction of saving for retirement is through
personal retirement accounts, such as 401(k) plans, Individual Retirement
Accounts, and others. Including employer-provided non-401(k)-deﬁned
contribution plans, over 76 percent of contributions are to plans controlled
in large measure by individuals—who make participation, contribution,
withdrawal, and asset allocation decisions. In “Household Portfolio Allo-
cation over the Life Cycle,” Poterba and Samwick analyze the relationship
between age and portfolio structure of U.S. households. They ﬁnd impor-
tant diﬀerences in whether people own assets and portfolio shares over the
life cycle. In addition, they ﬁnd important diﬀerences by birth cohort.
The authors motivate their analysis by emphasizing that recent and pro-
spective aging of the populations in developed countries has attracted at-
tention in many nations. The potential eﬀects of population aging on social
Introduction 5security systems and the level of private and national saving have drawn
the most interest from both academics and policy analysts. In the United
States particular attention has focused on the adequacy of the baby boom
generation’s level of retirement saving. The way households allocate their
accumulated saving across diﬀerent assets—such as stocks, bonds, and
real estate—has attracted less discussion, even though future economic
security can depend as much on the way assets are invested as on the
levelo fthose assets. Asset allocation is also essential for understanding the
behavior of individuals in the increasingly popular deﬁned contribution
pension plans that allow participants some discretion in their investment
choices and for analyzing recent proposals for Social Security reform that
call for mandatory saving accounts, with investment responsibility dele-
gated to individuals.
Although there is little empirical work on asset allocation, there is a
theoretical literature on the optimal portfolio behavior of individuals at
diﬀerent ages. This work is characterized by some controversy, in part be-
tween academics and practical ﬁnancial advisers. In the standard portfolio
choice paradigm that underlies most of ﬁnancial economics, the only fac-
tor that should explain age-related diﬀerences in portfolio structure is
diﬀerential risk aversion. In this setting, if a household is endowed with a
time-invariant risk tolerance, then there should be no age-related patterns
of portfolio allocation. Conditional on a household’s risk aversion, there
are strong predictions regarding the mix of risky and riskless assets that
ah o u s ehold should hold. Moreover, regardless of their risk aversion, all
households should hold risky assets in the same proportions within their
risky asset portfolios.
This paper complements the substantial theoretical discussion of age-
related patterns in asset allocation. It presents systematic empirical evi-
dence on the basic patterns of household asset allocation over the life
cycle. This information can help to evaluate competing models of house-
hold portfolio behavior, and more generally to assess proposals for greater
reliance on household choices in retirement preparation. Using multiple
waveso fthe Surveys of Consumer Finances, the authors control for sys-
tematic diﬀerences across birth cohorts in the age-speciﬁc pattern of asset
ownership. Poterba and Samwick provide two broad conclusions. First,
there are important diﬀerences across asset classes in both the age-speciﬁc
probabilities of asset ownership and in the portfolio shares of diﬀerent
assets at diﬀerent ages. The notion that all assets can be treated as identical
from the standpoint of analyzing household wealth accumulation is not
supported by the data. Institutional factors, asset liquidity, and evolving
investor tastes must be recognized in modeling asset demand. These fac-
tors could aﬀect analyses of overall household saving as well as the com-
position of this saving. Second, there are evident diﬀerences in the asset
ownership probabilities of diﬀerent birth cohorts. Older households were
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bonds, than were younger households, at any given age. Recognizing these
diﬀerences across cohorts is important when analyzing asset accumula-
tion proﬁles.
The authors emphasize that empirical evidence on the structure of
household portfolios bears on a variety of questions in ﬁnancial economics
and public ﬁnance. One question that the results address is the degree to
which the standard life cycle framework of asset accumulation can be ap-
plied to diﬀerent components of wealth. The life cycle model posits a
hump-shaped pattern of asset accumulation as households age: They accu-
mulate assets during their working years and spend down those assets dur-
ing their retirement years. The results in the paper by Poterba and Sam-
wick suggest that the hump-shaped pattern is not uniform across all assets.
Fore xample, as a percentage of total assets, ﬁnancial assets show just the
opposite pattern; they decline as households age, and then begin to in-
crease at advanced ages. Investment real estate and equity in privately held
businesses do display a hump-shaped pattern, as in the life cycle model,
buto wner-occupied housing does not, since there is no evident decline in
itso wnership at older ages.
The standard life cycle model does not distinguish between various types
of assets. Yet when assets exhibit diﬀerent degrees of liquidity (e.g., with
ﬁnancial assets more liquid than business net worth or other real estate
assets), the age pattern of asset holdings may contain important clues for
evaluating competing theories of saving behavior. Precautionary saving
models suggest that households should seek assets that can be liquidated
in the event of a ﬁnancial need. The diﬀerent age proﬁles that we identify
should therefore provide grist for future research on motives for saving.
As econd issue that their ﬁndings address is the importance of cohort-
speciﬁc factors, such as experience with historical returns on diﬀerent as-
sets or exposure to ﬁnancial advertisements, in shaping portfolio patterns.
Baby boomers show roughly the average propensity to hold taxable equity
and the average portfolio share of taxable equity. Younger cohorts show
greater investment in taxable bonds, tax-exempt bonds, and tax-deferred
accounts than do older cohorts. They show lower investments in bank ac-
counts and other ﬁnancial assets. Compared with previous cohorts, the
baby boom generation appears to be more willing to take advantage of
the more sophisticated ﬁnancial instruments that have become available
over the past twenty years.
Younger cohorts have also leveraged their assets to a greater extent than
older cohorts. This suggests that greater use of debt may also be the result
of liberalization of ﬁnancial markets over the last two decades. Nonethe-
less, the burden of servicing this debt will reduce the extent to which the
baby boomers can use their assets to support consumption in retirement.
Theirr e sults suggest that borrowing behavior should receive attention,
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tirement.
The authors point out that the important cohort patterns they identify
suggest that it is essential to distinguish between the saving and asset accu-
mulation of various cohorts as they approach retirement. The experience
of onec ohorta si ta pproaches retirement may not translate to other,
younger cohorts. These results provide a warrant for the type of research
nowb eing undertaken, in many contexts, on the retirement planning and
preparation of the baby boom cohort in the United States.
In Japan
TheU nited States has a long history of analyses of the relationship be-
tween promised social security beneﬁts and private personal saving. The
weight of the evidence is that increased social security promises reduce
personal saving. Seki Asano ﬁnds that in Japan a reduction in social secu-
rity beneﬁts increased private saving. In his paper titled “The Social Secu-
rity System and the Demand for Personal Annuity and Life Insurance: An
Analysis of Japanese Microdata, 1990 and 1994,” Asano examines the ef-
fect of changes in the public social security system on the private life insur-
ance and annuity holdings of Japanese households.
Theh ousehold surveys used in the analysis were collected in 1990 and
1994. During this time period, the Japanese economy experienced two
important changes that are relevant for household saving. The ﬁrst was the
increase in the normal retirement age for social security from sixty to sixty-
ﬁve. (See the summary of the paper by Yukiko Abe, which considers the
labor supply incentive eﬀects of other reforms to the social security sys-
tem.) The second was a 40 percent decline in the value of marketable assets
such as real estate and corporate stock. Both of these changes should have
increased the need for households to accumulate additional personal
wealth.
The analysis in this paper proceeds in three stages. The ﬁrst involves the
carefulc alculation of the expected values of the annuity and life insurance
payments from the public pension system, both before and after the re-
forms. Thes econd stage of the paper sets up a model of wealth accumula-
tion based on the households’ needs to provide both annuities and life
insurance. In this model, public and personal saving are perfect substi-
tutes. As a result, households are predicted to reduce their own saving in
proportion to how much they are promised by the public systems. The last
stage is an econometric test of the model.
The main results are that private annuity saving increased by more than
enough to oﬀset the eﬀects of the government reform during this period.
There was also some evidence that the increase was concentrated among
the younger generations, who were most aﬀected by the reforms. Life in-
surance holdings were less aﬀected by the reforms. Overall, the results
8D a vid A. Wisesuggest a model of saving in which households have target levels of annuit-
ies and bequests and will save rapidly if necessary in order to achieve them.
In Japan and the United States
Many factors determine the intergenerational distribution of consump-
tion.P erhaps foremost among these is economic growth. A high rate of
economic growth enables each new generation to have higher levels of
both consumption and lifetime income than were attainable by previous
generations. In most economies experiencing rapid economic growth, the
younger generations share some of their gains through public pension
schemes that redistribute consumption from the young or middle-aged to
the less well-oﬀ older generation. As long as growth continues and the
dependency ratio (of retired to nonretired persons) remains low, such pro-
grams are little burden to younger generations. However, as the population
begins to age and economic growth slows, these intergenerational transfer
schemes can have signiﬁcant adverse eﬀects on the consumption of the
young. In Japan, as in the United States and other countries, there is a
seriousc oncern that existing social welfare programs excessively favor the
current older generation at great cost to younger generations. In “An Em-
pirical Investigation of Intergenerational Consumption Distribution: A
Comparison among Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom,”
Makoto Saito considers how the gains from economic growth have been
distributed among generations over the past thirty years in these three
countries.
The analysis focuses on how both consumption and lifetime income
have evolved for diﬀerent generations of workers in Japan, the United
States, and the United Kingdom. The analysis is based on age-classiﬁed
consumption data for each country, spanning the years 1959–94 for Japan,
1972–94 for the United States, and 1971–91 for the United Kingdom.
Directt abulationso fthese data reveal that in both the United States
and Japan, per capita consumption has declined substantially over time
fory ounger age groups, while consumption among the old has increased
dramatically. In contrast, the young in the United Kingdom have fared
better over time. This pattern raises the possibility that intergenerational
transfers from the young to the old are of much larger scale in the United
States and Japan than in the United Kingdom.
Thep aper next develops a theoretical framework to understand the
consumption of diﬀerent age groups over time. Observed consumption at
a point in time combines age eﬀects (e.g., the middle-aged consume more
than the old) and cohort eﬀects (e.g., older generation has higher post
transfer lifetime income than younger generation). The cohort eﬀects,
which represent each generation’s lifetime income available for consump-
tion, may diﬀer acrossg enerations. They represent the net eﬀect of the
complex interaction among economic growth, population aging, and the
Introduction 9scale of intergenerational transfer programs. Each of these factors may
vary both overt ime and across countries.
Age and cohort eﬀects are estimated using the time series of age-
classiﬁed consumption data. The empirical results are quite striking. In
Japan lifetime income available for consumption peaked for the cohort
born between 1932 and 1936. In the United States lifetime income peaked
for the generation born between 1947 and 1951. Thus, in both countries
younger generations fare worse than older generations. In contrast, life-
time incomes are higher for successively younger cohorts in the United
Kingdom.T hus it appears that the interactions among slower economic
growth, population aging, and government transfer policy have produced
aq u i te diﬀerent intergenerational distribution of consumption in the
United Kingdom than in either Japan or the United States.
In addition to the principal ﬁnding regarding consumption trends in the
three countries, several other results emerge as well. First, the results reject
dynastic models based on altruism as explanations for consumption behav-
iori nall three countries. Such models predict consumption smoothing
across generations. The prediction is not supported by the data. Second,
although the lifetime income may be falling for younger cohorts in the
United States and Japan, it does not necessarily follow that the standard
of living has decreased for these recent cohorts. The reason for this is that
the real prices of goods fall in a growing economy. Indeed, the author
calculates that based on the estimation results, the U.S. economy need
grow at an annual rate of only 1.3 percent over the next two decades for
the younger generation to keep up with the middle-aged generation. Fi-
nally, the estimated speciﬁcation tested for liquidity constraints as an ex-
planation for intergenerational diﬀerences in consumption by including the
change in labor income as a determinant of the change in consumption.
Form osta ge intervals in all three countries, liquidity constraints are not
an important source of diﬀerences in intergenerational consumption.
Health Care
In the United States and Other Countries
Health care is of particular importance to older persons, and the rising
cost of health care is an important concern in almost all industrialized
countries. In his paper titled “The Third Wave in Health Care Reform,”
David Cutler comments on a wave of health care reform that he believes
will emphasize the eﬃciency of medical care. He draws attention to what
he foresees in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries in general, including the United States and Japan.
Thet itle of Cutler’s paper refers to a forecast about coming trends in
health care reform. He believes that a third wave of health care reform,
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come common in the OECD in the next ﬁve to ten years.
The ﬁrst wave of health care reform, Cutler assumes, was from the early
1950s until the early 1980s. In this era, most OECD countries built their
health insurance systems. Universal coverage was guaranteed, and beneﬁts
were quite generous. There were few restrictions on the provision of ser-
vices. As a result, medical spending consumed an increasing part of the
economies of all OECD countries.
The growing cost of medical care led to the second wave of reform: a
focus on cost containment. The most obvious way to limit medical spend-
ing is simply to limit the total amount of resources the medical sector can
consume. Since governments in the OECD typically paid for most, if not
all, of medical care spending, the government could easily limit overall
spending. Furthermore, overall spending limits did not conﬂict with the
goal of universal insurance coverage to a generous set of beneﬁts. Thus,
the 1980s saw the advent of wide-scale limits on medical spending in ag-
gregate: global budgets for hospitals, volume reductions on physicians,
and spending limits in institutions in the public sector.
However, limiting spending without altering the underlying demand or
supply relations, Cutler emphasizes, does not necessarily lead to eﬃcient
medical care provision. In many countries, tight budget constraints have
lead to ineﬃcient provision of services and a growing role for the public
sector. Some countries have concluded—and the author believes more will
follow—that they need additional reforms to provide more of a market
role in medical care provision. He refers to this incipient trend as the third
wave of healthcare reform.
In this paper, Cutler documents the trends in OECD medical systems
over the past ﬁfty years. The world’sm edical systems have been in ﬂux for
most of the past ﬁfty years. At ﬁrst, countries built up their medical care
system. Coverage was made universal, and beneﬁts were generous. There
wasl i ttle demand- or supply-side cost sharing.
In the early 1980s, countries realized the unaﬀordability of generous
demand incentives with no control over medical care supply. The typical
response was to limit the total amount of services that could be provided.
Given the commitment to universal insurance and low cost sharing that
most countries had, this was the logical response. And this response saved
money:T he 1980s were characterized by much lower growth of medical
costs than were the previous twenty years.
However, the strains in this approach ultimately became apparent. Ex-
cess demand with limits on the supply side led to waiting lists, nonpricing
rationing, and the incentive to seek services out of the public sector. As a
result, concern is shifting to the eﬃciency aspects of the market as well as
the overall cost of the system.
Af ocus on eﬃciency, Cutler forecasts, is likely to involve two reforms,
Introduction 11whichh echaracterizes as the third wave of health care reform: increased
competition for services, either at the level of the provider or at the level
of the insurer; and increased patient cost sharing. Neither of these are easy
reformst ou n dertake. Increased competition increases the incentives for
adverse selection; increased cost sharing is more burdensome for the poor
than for the rich. However, countries are ﬁnding, or are likely to ﬁnd, that
they have no alternative but to try these reforms.
As countries undertake a new round of health reform, it is important to
keep one point in mind, says Cutler. To some extent, most countries are
prisoners of what is done in the United States. When medical technology
advances in the United States, it must ultimately advance around the
world. Countries can make their systems more or less eﬃcient and can
speed up or delay the use of these technologies, but they are unlikely to
postpone them forever. In this sense, stable medical reform around the
world is likely to await stable medical reform in the United States.
In Japan
As in the United States, there are large diﬀerences in health care expen-
ditures by geographic region. In their paper titled “Concentration and Per-
sistence of Health Care Costs for the Aged,” Seiritsu Ogura and Reiko
Suzuki examine diﬀerences in health care costs for the elderly among mu-
nicipalities in Japan.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) releases data on regional
diﬀerences in healthcare expenditure yearly. According to this data, look-
ing at average per capita expenditure of those enrolled in the National
Health Insurance Plan, expenditure ranged from the lowest in Okinawa to
the highest in Hokkaido, where 1.97 times the Okinawa amount was spent
on health care. Regional diﬀerences in health care expenditure are a phe-
nomenon not unique to Japan, but can be seen in many other countries.
They areamuch larger issue in the United States, where the health care
system is more market oriented, than in Japan. Although these regional
discrepancies in Japan have been declining gradually, they still attract con-
siderable attention in Japan. In particular, health care for the elderly takes
up such a large share of total health care costs that it can alter the entire
makeup of health care spending. Thus, in this study Suzuki and Ogura
analyze the regional variation in elderly health care costs.
Probably the major reason for regional diﬀerences in health care expen-
diture, the authors conclude, lies in the oversupply of such health care
facilities as staﬀ, beds, and physicians. Recently, there has been specula-
tion that the introduction of high-priced medical testing equipment such
as computed axial tomography (CAT) scan and magnetic resonance im-
aging (MRI) equipment has caused advanced medical technology to be-
come more widespread, thereby raising health care costs as well.
The ﬁrst objective of the paper is to determine the factors behind the
12 David A. Wiseregional diﬀerences in health care expenditure, and to see how much of
these discrepancies could be narrowed through equalizing the allocation
of health care facilities and staﬀ.T hen, focusing on the government’s
transfers, which in eﬀectt r ansfer resources to areas with a high share of
elderly, or with low income, the second objective is to see if it is important
to attempt to close this gap, and if so, to clarify which features of expendi-
ture might most appropriately be equalized.
In an eﬀortt oc ontrolh e althcare costs, the MHW chooses about 150
municipalities (cities, towns, and villages) and requests that they make ef-
forts toreduce healthcare expenditures. Municipalitiesare thesmallest ad-
ministrative units and are the insurance agents of the National Health In-
surance Plan. The guidance to the municipalities is intended to encourage
them to restrain wasteful healthcare spending on their enrollees (the resi-
dents in their municipalities). The authors emphasize that it is diﬃcult for
such small governmental units to bear large insurance risks, and they in
fact receive large subsidies from the central government to pay the differ-
ence between their revenue and outlays.
The variation across municipalities in health care expenditures for the
elderly is greater than the variation across larger geographical units such
as prefectures. Intensity of health care supply works to increase these dis-
crepancies, while the concentration of patients works to decrease them.
The authors say, however, that even if it were possible to decrease the
intensity of health care supply and patient density, and reduce diﬀerences
across municipalities, this would not work to close the gaps, because the
variation in expenditures is much greater than can be explained by the
medical resources and patient density.
Since the elderly in low-income municipalities have longer hospital
stays, health care expenditure is much higher than that in high-income
municipalities. This is because low-income households do not have the
capacity to care for the elderly in their homes, and hospitals take over the
function of nursing homes. In addition,i nl o w-income areas the revenue
from insurance premiums is quite low, and these municipalities receive
subsidies from the central government to pay for health care. In the pres-
ent situation in which nursing care services are far from adequate, forcing
the municipalities with high health care expenditures to lower their expen-
ditures would mean that the channels for income transfer would be nar-
rowed,a nd the income gap between the low- and high-income areas would
widen, the authors say.
The smaller the population in the municipality, the greater the variation
in their expenditure on health care. Municipalities with fewer than 1,000
people account for 25 percent of the cities, towns, and villages in this sur-
vey in eleven prefectures. The smaller municipalities are more likely to
bear the risk of ﬂuctuating health care expenditures. When considering
these municipalities as insurers, the smaller they are, the higher the insur-
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health care expenditures, and this covers these risks. Although this re-
insurance system is eﬀective, the authors argue that it would be better to
expand the insurance base so that the risk is lowered. It is not, they say,
rational to divide Japan into 3,251 separate insurance zones.
Satoshi Nakanishi and Noriyoshi Nakayama analyze the eﬀects of dem-
ographic change on medical expenditures in Japan in their paper titled
“The Eﬀects of Demographic Change on Health and Medical Expendi-
tures: A Simulation Analysis.”
The goal of this study is to analyze the eﬀecto fd e mographic change on
the health sector and the larger economy. The authors develop a simulation
model with three sectors: (a) demand for medical services, (b) production
of medical services, and (c) the general economy. Demand for medical
services deals with patient behavior, and production of medical services
deals with the behavior of hospitals and clinics. General economy models
production of consumer goods other than health services and capital
goods.
The share of GDP accounted for by medical expenditures will reach
11.3 percentby 2015. From 1960to 1994, medical expendituresgrew an av-
erage of 12.3 percent annually, greater than the 10.1 percent annual growth
of GDP in the same period. As a result, medical expenditures as a per-
centageo fGDP doubled from 2.5 percent in 1960 to 5.4 percent in 1994.
From 1980 to 1994, medical expenditures grew at a slower rate, 5.5 percent
per annum, after the Japanese government adopted a cost containment
strategy aimed at limiting reimbursement rates while increasing the self-
payment rate.
Ther esults of the authors’ simulation suggest that under the present
health care system, the demand for medical care will grow at 2.7 percent
perannum from 1991 to 2010. The share of GPD accounted for by medical
expenditure will reach 11.3 percent by 2015 and thereafter will gradually
decline. Although medical care expenditure will increase, the authors con-
clude that population aging will depress the health status of the typical
elderly person. The authors ﬁnd that it will be diﬃcult to maintain the
present level of health status in the 21st century. The authors also say that
government cost containment strategies will mean that individuals will
have to pay more for their own health care.I naddition, the authors foresee
a fall in national health status.
In the United States
In the United States, choice among health care plans has become an
accepted goal of both employer-provided and public health care programs.
Choice, however, brings with it the potential of adverse selection of high-
cost users of medical care into generous and higher-cost plans. In “Choice
among Employer-Provided Insurance Plans,” Matthew J. Eichner consid-
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varyi ng e nerosity and in their cost to employees. Perhaps the central con-
clusion is that employees are reluctant to choose high-deductible plans—
with greater risk of out-of-pocket costs—even though the lower premium
fors uch plans would seemingly leave employees better oﬀ ﬁnancially.
While Eichner’s analysis is based on the choices of employed persons, the
ideas are equally applicable to older persons choosing among health care
plans.
More choice has emerged as a politically palatable alternative to funda-
mental health reform in the United States. After several decades of rapid
increases in the cost of providing coverage to employees, the elderly and
the indigent, there was widespread anticipation of some governmental re-
form of the health care market. But even before it became clear that such
reform would not materialize, and with increasing momentum afterward,
ﬁrms sought to induce their employees to choose alternatives to the tradi-
tional fee-for-service plans, which presented the insured, their providers,
or both with better incentives to control costs.
The incentives oﬀered by ﬁrms to accept these new alternatives typically
include expanded coverage and lower monthly premiums collected in the
form of payroll deductions. Many employees now choose between a tra-
ditional fee-for-service plan with cost sharing and comparatively high
payroll deductions, and one or more health maintenance organizations
(HMOs) with no cost sharing and dramatically lower monthly payroll de-
ductions. The HMOs use administrative or supply-side mechanisms to
control the costs of providing care.
Thef e deral government, too, has seized on choice as a means to lower
health care costs. The Medicare program has allowed a number of HMOs
to sign up the elderly. In return for accepting administrative controls over
provision of services, the elderly are oﬀered an expanded basket of services
(typically including such things as pharmaceuticals and well-care) and
freed from the bother of applying and then waiting for reimbursement
from the Medicare system.
While HMOs have been in the forefront of the health care reform move-
ment, other alternatives to traditional fee-for-service coverage have also
emerged. The Health Insurance Access and Portability Act of 1996,
known also as the Kennedy-Kassebaum bill, authorizes a limited trial of
catastrophic insurance. Instead of seeking to implement cost control
through administrative mechanisms and essentially eliminating coinsur-
ance, catastrophic insurance aims to make individuals behave as if they
ares pending their own money. To provide the necessary liquidity to satisfy
deductibles that might be several thousand dollars, the Kennedy-
Kassebaum bill also provides for a tax-favored savings account from which
expenditures below the level of the deductible are paid. This eliminates the
tax advantages of low-deductible, high-premium insurance plans.
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about insurance is critical. There are two fundamental questions, the an-
swers to which will determine the long-term prospects of a system incorpo-
ratingah igh degree of choice among insurance alternatives. First, adverse
selection of sicker individuals into the more generous coverage options is
of concern. The initial estimates of cost saving from managed care and
other alternative arrangements surely is at least in part due to the fact that
these schemes attract the healthiest segments of the covered population.
There is reason to suspect therefore that the cost savings will disappear or
at least diminish as the number of people covered under the new alterna-
tives—and the number of comparatively unhealthy people in particular—
increases. Equally important is employee responsiveness to the pricing of
the various insurance options. For example, how much lower must premi-
ums be before large numbers of covered individuals will accept greater
levels of risk bearing.
TheE ichner paper presents some basic evidence on how employees
choose health insurance coverage from a menu of options. (There is some
evidence that they hesitate to choose low deductible plans, even though
these may be oﬀered at a discounted price that might leave them indiﬀer-
entt othe high deductible plan and other more generous coverage options.)
This conclusion, however, is based on adherence to a standard expected
utility approach, which might prove an inadequate framework for evaluat-
ing employee willingness to bear risk. In addition, the conclusions are no
doubt sensitive to how one views the likelihood of persistent losses over a
comparatively long time period. Applying this technique to the issue of
plan choice is a future goal of this work.
In addition, the paper examines evidence concerning those employees
who change plans voluntarily. This group consists disproportionately of
larger family groupings that tend to move between two more-generous cov-
erage options. Movement between plans seems to be associated with
higher expenditures both before and after the move.
Labor Market Incentives
In Japan
Populations in almost all countries are aging rapidly, and life expectan-
cies are increasing. Indeed, there is growing evidence that in the United
States the health status of persons at retirement ages is increasing as well.
Yet in almost countries persons are leaving the labor force at younger and
younger ages. Perhaps Japan is an exception. Not only has the decline in
laborf orce participation been modest in Japan, but even that modest de-
cline has been met with changes in social security provisions, in an attempt
to reverse the trend. Among industrialized countries, the fall in labor force
participation of men between the ages of sixty and sixty-four has been
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participation of men in this age group in Japan has increased. An apparent
reason for the increase was a series of changes in the provisions of the
Japanese social security system, which was intended to reduce the incen-
tive to retire early.I n“Employees’ Pension Beneﬁts and the Labor Supply
of Older Japanese Workers, 1980s–1990s,” Yukiko Abe considers the ef-
fects of the disincentive in the system prior to the reform, as well as the
potential eﬀects of the reforms.
There are three major public pensions in Japan. The Employees’ Pen-
sion insurance (EP) covers workers in the private sector and their spouses
and is the largest public pension system in Japan. Public sector employees
and private school personnel are covered by mutual aid associations
(MAA) of several diﬀerent types. Self-employed workers are covered by
the National Pension (NP). Here, the focus is on the institutional structure
relevant to the beneﬁt structure for those who are covered by EP and are
subject to provisions for working beneﬁciaries.
Currently, EP participants are eligible to receive beneﬁts at age sixty
(whereas the NP eligibility starts at age sixty-ﬁve). The starting age for EP
eligibility is scheduled to increase gradually from 2001 to 2013. That is,
before the eligibility age, EP participants aged sixty to sixty-four will re-
ceive only the beneﬁt portion that is proportional to their lifetime EP con-
tributions and will not receive the base beneﬁts that the plan provides.
Prior changes starting in the late 1980s were also intended to reduce early
retirement incentives. However, even under the current system, work disin-
centivess t ill exist, according to Abe.
In her paper, Abe examines the eﬀects of EP beneﬁt rules on labor
supply. Although Abe’s estimates suggest that the increase in labor supply
of older persons in the early 1990s cannot be attributed in large part to
the reforms she analyzes, several other reforms occurred concurrently and
may have contributed to the increase in labor force participation: The
mandatory retirement age was increased; subsidies were provided for hir-
ing older workers; and the maximum number of hours worked was re-
duced.
In the United States
In the United States, there are also strong incentives to leave the labor
force early. In “The Motivations for Business Retirement Policies,” Rich-
ardW o odbury examines the reasons for early retirement incentives in
employer-provided pension plans in the United States. Unlike most analy-
ses of incentive eﬀects of pension plans, his analysis is based on extensive
interviews with corporate executives. He concludes that even though the
retirement incentives are strong—as demonstrated by other authors—the
wish to encourage older employees to leave the workforce is “typically not
ac entral motivation for the policy design” (331).
Most traditionally deﬁned beneﬁt pension plans in the United States
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cial incentive to retire often begins as young as age ﬁfty-ﬁve. By age sixty-
ﬁve,e ssentially all pension plans encourage retirement. The ﬁnancial in-
centivesi np ension plans and their signiﬁcant eﬀects on retirement have
been the subject of a growing literaturei ne conomics (see, e.g., Lumsdaine
and Wise 1994). Absent from the literature, however, is any clear analysis
of whyﬁ rmsh aved esigned pension plans this way. To the extent that ﬁrm
motivationsa re addressed, the common theoretical assumption is that the
incentives are deliberate business policy decisions designed to induce re-
tirement among older workers who are paid more for their productive
value.1 But this assumption is made without any evidence from the compa-
nies that have implemented the plans. It may also be true, as suggested
tangentially by Kotlikoﬀ and Wise (1989), that ﬁrms are largely unaware
of the complex ﬁnancial incentives in their pension plans. It may be that
ﬁrms have designed their plans for completely diﬀerent reasons. Wood-
bury’s study sets out to understand better the motivations of ﬁrms in de-
signing pension plans, as well as why these motivations have resulted in
plans that have the eﬀect ofe ncouraging early retirement.
The issue has particular importance in the context of current demo-
graphic trends. The average number of years spent in retirement has in-
creased steadily, partly as a result of increasing life expectancy, and partly
as a result of people retiring at younger ages. Between 1950 and 1997,
labor force participation rates of older men dropped signiﬁcantly—from
46 percentt o1 7p ercenta mong men aged sixty-ﬁve and older, and from
87 percentt o6 7p ercenta mong men between ages ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-four.
Among women, the large increase in labor force participation at younger
ages is absent at older ages, suggesting the oﬀsetting decision to retire
earlier among women as well. The ﬁnancial incentives in pension plans are
an important factor aﬀecting trends in retirement behavior and inducing
earlier retirement decisions. To the extent that these early retirement deci-
sionsa re made based on distorted (or unintended) economic incentives,
they represent a loss in both labor productivitya nd social welfare—which
will only grow larger as the population ages.
Woodbury’s study is based on the experiences of twenty large U.S. cor-
porations. The analysis draws in particular on a series of discussions about
policy history and objectives with executives at each company, and on a
review of internal business documents relating to the design of the policies.
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1. The primary theoretical framework for this assumption derives from the literature on
implicit contracts. According to the theory, workers are paid less than their productive value
at younger ages, and more than their productive value at older ages, creating an incentive for
workers not to change jobs, and to work harder in anticipation of the future reward. Pensions
then serve as a means of inducing retirement (or at least reducing the eﬀective compensation)
among those older workers who would otherwise be paid more than their productive value
(see Lazear 1981).For someo fthe companies, several days were spent visiting the corporate
headquarters, meeting with corporate personnel (including human re-
source executives, ﬁnancial aﬀairs executives, and employee beneﬁts plan-
ners and administrators), and reading through business documents.
Woodbury emphasizes that the analysis identiﬁed a number of objec-
tivesa nd motivationsf or the design of business retirement policies, includ-
ing, in some cases, the desire for older workers to retire. In most cases,
however, retirement incentives were either unintentional or secondary to
the policy’s central motivation. In general, companies were much more
concerned with providing competitive retirement policies (policies similar
in structure and in value to those of their competitors in the labor market)
and policies that adequately provided for the well-being of their retirees.
Thed esigna nd ongoing evaluation of the policies were targeted primarily
toward monitoring the retirement policies oﬀered by their competitors, as
well as assessing the adequacy of their policies in satisfying (but not ex-
ceeding) the income replacement needs of their retirees.
Woodbury ﬁnds that at fourteen of the twenty companies participating
in this study, all employees participate in a retirement policy with incen-
tivest or etire at particular ages. At another three of the companies, some
categories of employees participate in a retirement policy with incentives
to retire at particular ages. Only three companies have retirement policies
that do not encourage the retirement of older workers. Despite the wide-
spread use of policies that encourage retirement, the main ﬁnding of this
study is that retirement incentives are typically not a central motivation
for the policy design.
Two motivationsh aved o minated the design of current business retire-
ment policies: concern about retiree welfare, and concern about competi-
tiveness in the labor market. A great deal of the current structure of busi-
ness retirement policies is based on paternalistic company values. Many
executives indicate that their companies have a responsibility to insure the
well-being of retired employees, and because of this responsibility, many
executives view their retirement policies more as entitlements or welfare
forr etired employees than as compensation for working employees. This
view of retirement policies is reﬂected in pension plans and postretirement
medical plans that are designed to support the needs of retired employees.
The eﬀecto fthese company values on the economic structure of retire-
ment policies is to encourage retirement. The beneﬁts of those retiring
early cannot be reduced too dramatically, or early retirees will be unable
to maintain their preretirement standard of living. Similarly, the beneﬁts
of those retiring late need not be increased, since their preretirement stan-
dard of living can be maintained with normal beneﬁt levels. Thus, the
retirement policies have an economic structure that encourages retirement,
even though retirement incentives are not a central motivation in the pol-
icy design.
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eﬀecto fspreading these traditional policies more widely through the busi-
ness community. In order to be competitive, companies choose policies
with a similar structure and a similar value to those oﬀered by competing
employers. Thus, companies without strong paternalistic values are driven
by competitive pressures to implement policies with the same economic
structure. Whether the policies at a company are motivated more by a
concern for retiree welfare or by a concern for competitiveness in the labor
market, the same policies with the same economic structure and the same
retirement incentives are chosen. In either case, it is not the retirement
incentives that motivate the policy design.
Given the loss in productive activity caused by retirement in the United
States, it is potentially worrisome, says Woodbury, that businesses do not
consider the eﬀect of their policies on retirement behavior more carefully.
At the same time, however, most businesses are not unsatisﬁed with the
retirement behavior taking place under their policies. While inﬂuencing
retirement behavior is not the motivation for retirement policies, the poli-
cies seem tob ea ﬀecting retirement behavior in a way that is roughly con-
sistent with company preferences. Executives at many of the companies in
this study are quite satisﬁed that older workers retire, and they claim that
many older workers are paid more than their productive value. Thus, one
need not conclude from this study that the retirement induced by pension
plans represents an economic distortion.
There is even some indication that companies unsatisﬁed with the retire-
ment behavior of their workers look to their retirement policies as poten-
tial instruments for changing retirement behavior. Most obviously, the in-
creasing use of early retirement window plans has focused a great deal of
attention on the potential for retirement policies to inﬂuence retirement
behavior. Most executives also broadly recognize the behavioral incentives
in their regular retirement policies.
In short, the assumption that pensions are deliberately designed to en-
courage retirement is not supported by this study. However, Woodbury
concludes, as the population continues to age, and as retirement policies
consume an even larger percentage of corporate payrolls, businesses are
likely to focus much more attention on the retirement behavior of their
workers and, consequently, on the relationships between retirement poli-
cies and retirement behavior. Indeed, if this same study were conducted in
2020, when the baby boom generation would be retiring in record num-
bers, it would likely reach some very diﬀerent conclusions about the key
motivations for retirement policy decisions.
In Japan
Returning to incentives in Japan, in their paper titled “Promotion, In-
centives, and Wages,” Toshiaki Tachibanaki and Tetsuya Maruyama con-
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the working life in Japan. There is a growing interest in the relationship
between incentive pay and careers in organizations, and in particular be-
tween incentive pay and promotion up the hierarchical ladder. This study
considers evidence on this issue in Japan. The authors suggest that popula-
tion aging in Japan and slower ﬁrm growth rates have increased motivation
to develop internal labor policies that enhance the work incentives of em-
ployees. In their paper, the authors focus on the relationship between
worker eﬀort and incentive eﬀects, based on data from several large Japa-
nese ﬁrms. The central conclusion of the paper is that the eﬀect of incen-
tives diﬀers according to an employee’s level in the ﬁrm hierarchy: The
wage rate provides work incentive at early career stages; at mid-level stages
promotion is the important incentive; and at the top level neither matters.
The authors emphasize that there has been growing awareness in Japan
that average labor productivity of blue-collar workers is quite high, but
productivity of white-collar workers is low, compared with other industri-
alized nations. The authors cite several reasons that they believe support
this view. First, team production is common among manual workers in the
manufacturing industries, and the authors believe that such a production
system can increase labor productivity without necessarily requiring
strong individual leadership. Second, the authors observe that nonmanu-
facturing industries in which the majority of workers are white-collar show
lower labor productivity than do ﬁrms populated primarily by production
workers. Third, the authors say, leadership and the capability of able and
motivated persons are crucial to the productivity of white-collar employ-
ees,i fthey are engaged in complicated jobs. Fourth, the authors propose
that a compressed wage structure and a seniority-based promotion sys-
tem—which are typical features of internal labor markets in Japan—are
perhaps appropriate for manual workers but not for white-collar workers.
Thef ocus of the paper is whether the latter proposition is supported by
the evidence.
The study investigates the relationship between work eﬀort on the one
hand and wages and promotion on the other hand. Evidence from white-
collar workers in several large Japanese ﬁrms was used to investigate this
issue. The authors present several conclusions. For example, the position
an employee holds in the hierarchical ladder is crucial in understanding
the relationships among promotion, eﬀort, and wages. The eﬀect of wages
on eﬀorti si mportant for employees early in their careers: the higher the
wage payment, the higher the eﬀort for these employees. However, promo-
tion is the key reward that increases the eﬀorts of mid-career employees.
Fore m ployees at the top, the authors conclude that neither incentive
works to promote productivity. Unobservable factors, including “pull” or
“luck,” seem to be important determinants of the advancement of these
employees. The authors say that one reason incentive mechanisms work
Introduction 21only fore m ployees in early careers is that employees who have been pro-
moted rapidly to higher positions have already shown that they are highly
motivated in any case.
What are the implications for human resource management, in view of
recent population aging and slower ﬁrm growth rates in Japan? The au-
thors point to the importance of increasing worker productivity incentives.
The authors conclude that competition among employees, in particular
among younger employees, will work to increase productivity. Such com-
petition, they say, is likely to distinguish between capable employees and
less-capable employees early in their careers. Quicker promotions for ca-
pablee m ployees and a wider wage dispersion among employees, the au-
thors conclude, are unavoidable.
Population Projections in Japan
Poor population projections have been one important reason why fore-
casts of the ﬁnancial status of the Social Security trust fund have been so
inaccurate in the United States. Indeed, many prominent demographers
have been critical of the wayi nw hich Social Security Administration fore-
casts are obtained. As it turns out, forecasts are incorrect elsewhere as well.
In “What Went Wrong with the 1991–92 Oﬃcial Population Projection of
Japan?” Seiritsu Ogura explores the reasons for the error in 1992 projec-
tions in Japan.
On two grounds one can say that the track record of the last two Japa-
nese oﬃcial population projections is very poor. One is the absence of
accuracy in the projections, even in the medium run. The other is making
the wrong assumptions in the long-run trend. Every ﬁve years, the Na-
tional Institute of Population Research makes three projections based on
high-, middle-, and low-fertility assumptions, and it is the projection based
on the middle-fertility assumption that is regarded as the oﬃcial popula-
tion projection. The projection is automatically linked to many long-term
plans that the government agencies make, from public pensions projec-
tionst oe nergy projections. The 1986 projection, which predicted a recov-
ery of Total Fertility Rate (TFR) to 2.0, overestimated 1991 births by al-
most 300,000, or 20 percent. In fact, during this period, TFR dropped
from 1.764 in 1985 to 1.51 in 1991. Despite this experience, demographers
at the Institute predicted a recovery in TFR starting in 1995. At this time,
however, there seems to be no sign of the predicted recovery, and the TFR
has continued to slip during the last ﬁve-year period.
Despite this rather poor performance from the purely technical point of
view, Ogura says that the 1992 projection was a very innovative one. Most
signiﬁcant, he says, was the way it tried to estimate age-speciﬁc fertility
rates of the cohorts that had recently entered into the reproduction stage
by ﬁtting the data to a class of statistical distributions. Thus armed, it
22 David A. Wisedeclared that Japanese women have been temporarily delaying marriage
and childbearing, which would come to an end by the mid-1990s to raise
the TFR to where it was in the mid-1980s. According to Ogura, however,
their attempt to introduce science into the population projection was not
very successful in terms of its outcome, and it seems to have been aban-
doned in the latest projection.
In fact, the 1997 projections, which were made public in January 1997,
used fertility rates based on marriage rates and the marital fertility rates
of recent cohorts. These methods were used in the last two Japan Center
for Economic Research (JCER) population projections, which were made
by Ogura himself. As marriage precedes births by many years, it seems
natural to assume that using marriage data would be far more powerful in
predicting the number of future births than the sole use of women’s age,
in a given cohort, Ogura concludes. The JCER population projection has
been constructed on this simple idea, and sof ar it has been quite accurate,
says Ogura.
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